

The Quest for Legitimacy in Chinese Politics

Xiang explains the nature and depth of the legitimacy crisis facing the government of China, and why it is so frequently misunderstood in the West.

Arguing that it is more helpful to understand the quest for legitimacy in China as an eternally dynamic process, rather than to seek resolutions in constitutionalism, Xiang examines the understanding of legitimacy in Chinese political philosophy. He posits that the current crisis is a consequence of the incompatibility of Confucian Republicanism and Soviet-inspired Bolshevism. The discourse on Chinese political reform tends to polarize between total Westernization, on the one hand, and the rejection of Western influence in all forms, on the other. Xiang points to a third solution – meeting Western democratic theories halfway, avoiding another round of violent revolution.

This book provides valuable insights for scholars and students of China's politics and political history.

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The Quest for Legitimacy in Chinese Politics

A New Interpretation

Lanxin Xiang

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To my mother, who symbolizes China's modern history of interaction between the East and West. Growing up a devout Christian, a choir girl at an Episcopal church in Shanghai, she joined Communist Party 80 years ago to fight the Japanese. Today, at the age of 100, her favorite hobby is singing Battle March of the Republic in English, "Glory, glory, Hallelujah..."....."



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Introduction

Legitimacy – East and West

The fundamental dispute between China and the West focuses on the question of political legitimacy. No doubt, the People's Republic of China has been facing the most serious legitimacy crisis since its founding in 1949. But the roots of this crisis are generally misinterpreted in the West, because the conceptual framework in describing China has lost its validity. The prevailing assumption is that any political problem in China would come from a single source, i.e., lack of “democratic legitimacy.” But this interpretation cannot explain why China's legitimacy crisis has emerged during its most sustained period of economic boom in history. It is the contention of this book that there are twin sources of the current legitimacy crisis: on the one hand, there is the project of cultural restoration through which Chinese leader Xi Jinping attempts to restore “Confucian legitimacy” or the traditional “Mandate of Heaven”; on the other hand, Xi refuses to start any political reforms, because it is his top priority to preserve the existing political system, i.e., a ruling system derived mainly from an alien source, the Bolshevik Russia. The two objectives are totally incompatible and increasingly heading toward fatal clash. The communist rank and file, not to mention the population at large, has lost faith in this decision-making system.¹ No one, not even the most hardened communist ideologue, can explain why such alien system should be preserved forever – now the nation is on the path of cultural revival to realize so-called China Dream.

The prevailing scholarship in the West fails to comprehend the real Chinese legitimacy crisis, because it is deeply rooted in modern Western academic disciplines that are largely irrelevant to Chinese history and cultural tradition. The post-Enlightenment West has long interpreted politics in China through various disciplines of political “science,” political “philosophy” and, of course, the Eurocentric historiography. It has also created a language framework through which arbitrary judgment can only be sustained by political speech-acts.² As Ludwig Wittgenstein famously put it, “Words are also deeds.”³ Modern Western political analysis is often aimed at hiding political speech-acts behind conceptual abstractions; no matter what they are called: “philosophy,” “science” or “universal values.” Therefore, the most challenging task in this study is to navigate carefully the conceptual and logical traps created by post-Enlightenment terminologies that deliberately obscure the political speech-acts when dealing

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with China. Since it is written in a European language, I have to take extreme caution at dissecting most of the “master keywords” with interpretations drawn from the Chinese culture and history. Whether it succeeds in wading through the encirclement of conceptual landmines can only be judged by readers. This volume tackles a single master keyword in political discourse: legitimacy (*Hefa*, 合法性 in modern Chinese). It is part of the comprehensive study on four master keywords concerning modern and contemporary Chinese politics: legitimacy, republic, economy and foreign policy.

In Western tradition, legitimacy means the popular acceptance of an authority. “Authority” means a specific position in an established government; hence, the term “legitimacy” denotes a system of governing structure. In Western democratic context, therefore, political legitimacy depends on a structural arrangement of power, i.e., how power is divided. This is considered a basic condition for governing, without which a government will have no legitimacy.

In modern West, Max Weber was the original thinker of the question of political legitimacy. According to Weber in his famous essay “Politics as Vocation,” since

the state is seen as the sole grantor of the ‘right’ to physical force, ‘politics’ in our case would mean the pursuit for a *portion* of power or for influencing the *division* of power whether it is between states, or between groups of people which the state encompasses.

Hence, Weber argued for three kinds of authorities of political legitimacy: traditional, charisma and legal.⁴

In his rather perfunctory study of Confucian system, Weber advanced a view that the traditional Chinese system would not be sustainable, because it simply lacked progressive vision; charisma of a leader is a rare feature for an individual, and, thus, the only reliable and sustainable authority was legal and administrative one.⁵ In other words, of parliamentary politics, government must maintain under its own conditions power arrangements in order to sustain legitimacy. In law, the term “legitimacy” implies the legal status of the governing institutions and their actions with popular support.

As the following chapters will show, since the very beginning of the Greco-Roman tradition, politics has always maintained a *spatial* conception, as reflected in the term *polis* (a city or city-state) under the assumption that political power can be “divided” mechanically into fixed and static sections. Chinese civilization, however, has never developed a spatial dimension in politics. The Confucian conception of politics is entirely temporal, based on the dynamic idea that legitimacy is determined by a ruler’s daily moral behavior. In other words, politics equates virtual quality. None of the popular definitions and descriptions of political legitimacy adopted in the Western world can explain this type of legitimacy. Of course, the foundation of any political legitimacy is that the population at large still has confidence in their government’s actions which are morally appropriate and executed by a legally constituted government. The Chinese

term of legitimacy, or *Hefa*, contains two concepts, “fit” and “law” (合法), but here the term “law” does not reflect the same meaning, for it gives priority to, as we shall see in Chapter 3, morality rather than adjudication procedure.

Moreover, China has never developed a political “philosophy,” except in the classic Greek sense of the term “philo Sophia,” wisdom. Western political philosophy is the study of generalized questions about power, justice, law, the rights and obligations of the citizen. Traditional China could never produce such kind of abstract and generalized study on politics, because politics and ethics are interlinked subjects, like “*Yin* and *Yang*” dynamics, and because both subjects discuss the question of what constitutes a good government and how people should live. Legitimacy of a ruler is considered deriving from a Mandate of Heaven (*Tian Ming* 天命), and that unjust rulers will lose the mandate and will, therefore, lose the right to rule. This unique Chinese vision of legitimacy is at the outset a dynamic “deeds-based” rather than “procedure-based” argument. The Mandate of Heaven, literally “heaven-decreed mandate to rule,” is an ancient Chinese belief that *tiān* (天 heaven, though not Christian Heaven or God) grants emperor the right to rule based on their moral quality and *ability* to govern well and fairly. If he does not fulfill his moral obligations as emperor, the Mandate would then transfer to the one who does.

The Mandate of Heaven does not require a ruler to possess divine connection (as the Yamato dynasty in Japan), nor even noble blood (as common case in feudal Europe). A beggar or a monk could become emperor as well. The Mandate has no time limitations, depending instead on the just and able performance of the ruler and his heirs. The concept of the Mandate of Heaven was first used to support founding kings of the Zhou dynasty (1045–256 BC), and justify their overthrow of the despotic Shang dynasty (1600–1046 BC). This phrase has since been used to justify the legitimacy of rulers of the vast Chinese empire, including non-Han ethnic monarchs such as the Mongolian Yuan dynasty (1271–1368 AD) and the Manchu Qing dynasty (1644–1911 AD). The Mandate of Heaven has been a well-accepted idea among the people, since it advocates the removal of despots and compels rulers to rule well and justly. The concept has frequently been invoked by scholars in China as a way to fight against the abuse of power. Moreover, the Chinese view of history is cyclical, not linear; hence, it never aims at a predestined end. With this cyclical view, legitimacy is in fact a never-ending process of moral self-adjustment. Institutional arrangement cannot settle the question of legitimacy once for all.

Although the Mandate of Heaven sounds superficially similar to the European concept of the “Divine Right of Kings,” in fact it operated quite differently. Before modern times in Europe, political legitimacy was defined by blood lineage in royal successions, and there was no alternative interpretation. Illegitimacy, or usurpation of power, could easily be identified under the circumstances. In the European model, God was said to have granted a particular family the right to rule a country for all time, regardless of the rulers’ behavior. Moreover, in the Christian era at least, the Divine Right was an assertion that God forbade rebellions – it was a *sin* to oppose the king. In contrast, the Mandate of Heaven

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always justifies rebellion against a bad ruler. If a rebellion was successful in overthrowing an emperor, then it was a sign that he had already lost the Mandate and the rebel leader had gained it.

Modern understanding of legitimacy is quite different. The early modern scholar John Locke (1632–1704) said that political legitimacy derives from explicit and implicit popular consent of the governed.⁶ The 20th-century German political philosopher, Dolf Sternberger (1907–1989), summarized Locke’s argument: “Legitimacy is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised, both with a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern, and with some recognition by the governed of that right.”⁷

At the first glance, the idea of consent from the governed is also analogous to the Chinese Mandate of Heaven. But the fundamental difference between Europe and China on the question of legitimacy has been the absence of the interference in China from religion or a self-claimed higher (spiritual) authority over state power, primarily represented by “Papal legitimacy.” China has never developed a true religion in its original Latin sense of *religio*, i.e., belief in and reverence for a supernatural power or powers regarded as *creator* as well as *governor* of the universe. The Chinese have constructed neither a serious creation myth, nor a personified almighty God, but only a semi-secular Jade Emperor (玉皇大帝), who is supposed to live in heaven, but his power is hardly almighty and never truly divine. The world starts with *wuji* (无极, nothingness) according to the Chinese creation myth. The Jade Emperor is the merely head of the pantheon, but not responsible for creating the world at all. The politics of “church versus state” never existed.

Without institutionalized religious authority to interfere in political power, the Chinese are able to create a dynamic conception of legitimacy through the secular authority of general will of the populace, and thus arriving at this idea without the help of any *fictional* political theory such as divine rights of humanity and “social contract.” For the sake of convenience, we retain the old English translation of *Tian Ming* (天命) as the Mandate of Heaven, with the caveat that this is no Christian Heaven, but the combination of man, nature and the undefined supreme authority. This “unrevealed” Chinese monotheism was aptly described by German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) as “Chinese natural theology,” which is not in clash with the basic tenets of Christianity.⁸

Finally, the Mandate of Heaven as a key political term for legitimacy has nothing to do with territorially defined “empire.” In fact, the modern concept of “empire” (帝国) never existed in Chinese language until Meiji Japan, the first Westernized country in Asia, invented it by using two Chinese Kanjis (characters), *di* (帝, emperor) and *guo* (国, state), to create a term called *tigoku* 帝国 to denote a Western-style empire, typically with the possession of a multiethnic population and vast territories sprawling overseas. Many Western scholars consider the Mandate of Heaven an “imperial” concept designed for controlling vast territories, but the Chinese concept of legitimacy is purely a moral one. Acquiring overseas territories for population resettlement never occurred in Chinese history, and it does little to enhance legitimacy of the ruler.

Since modern times, legitimacy has become a political “ideology”⁹ because it has acquired a firmly established set of rules for divisions of power and procedural fairness in decision-making. Hence, legitimacy is commonly described as “the property that a regime’s procedures for making and enforcing laws are acceptable to its subjects.”¹⁰ It is not surprising that when legitimacy of a state is simply assessed by divisions of power, “democratic legitimacy” must be contrasted favorably with any nondemocratic system. Therefore, legitimizing one system has become a twin speech-act of delegitimizing another. But the alternative interpretation of legitimacy, such as the Mandate of Heaven, also has a clear implication that power is “given” and can be withdrawn. Does it imply popular democracy as some advocates of “Confucian democracy” claim?¹¹ Of course not, because it does not require the twin speech-act of delegitimizing another political system, for it contains no element of “demos” or “polis” which, in ancient Greece, denotes physical sizes of a human community reflecting above all spatial and mathematical conception of politics. Moreover, Confucian political tradition, as an ideology, is a direct expression of the theme that people have rights to start rebellion against state authorities – a theory appeared much earlier than John Locke’s convoluted argument about popular rights to fight against tyranny.¹² It was the European Enlightenment that began to dismiss the Mandate of Heaven as nothing but apology for “Oriental Despotism,” as we shall see in Chapter 2, thanks mainly to the works of Baron Charles Montesquieu (1689–1755).¹³

Debate over the nature of the Chinese system is not new. The first such debate in the West took place in the mid-17th century, known as the Chinese Rites Controversy.¹⁴ At that time in Europe, democratic ideology had not yet established itself as a rhetorical tool for the speech-act of disparaging other political systems, so whether the Chinese way of governance was legitimate was irrelevant. However, the Western dominance of the globe since the 18th century beyond Europe has created hegemony of Western thought. Premodern Europe’s rich interactions with the non-Western world are deliberately ignored by post-Enlightenment historians.¹⁵ A new orthodoxy promoting “progress” against “backwardness” and “civilization” against “barbarism” justified the “Whiteman’s Burden,” i.e., colonial expansion into all non-Western territories. Yet this orthodoxy obscured the relative position of the West itself during the tumultuous centuries of struggling for a position as a “rising” power and an “emerging” market on the world stage. During that era, its interactions with the non-West were characterized by competition rather than domination, accommodation rather than rejection and negotiation rather than hegemony.

The irony is while modern “democratic legitimacy” as a concept can only work with the act of delegitimizing other types of political system, the theme Mandate of Heaven never contains an element of disparaging other models of governance. Hence, there is always conceptual room for systemic improvement within the Chinese vision of politics, while the opposite may be true for the rigid Western vision which considers democracy to have reached the pinnacle of political improvement for all human societies, or even at an “end of history” without any room for improvement (Fukuyama 1992).

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It should be pointed out further that the superiority of “democratic legitimacy” has long been justified by two alleged advantages for Europeans, both allegedly rooted in culture: superior Christian ethics and exceptional talent for economic growth. Most Western scholars assume that democratic modernization and the accompanying economic progress can only take place in a Christian cultural context (or more precisely for Max Weber, a Protestant ethical context¹⁶). However, this “tradition versus modernity” paradigm has lost its validity in explaining contemporary China and many other “traditional states” on the rise again in the 21st century.

The “self-evident” truth of a positive relationship between a democratic system and economic well-being of its citizens can no longer be taken for granted even within the Western world. Indeed, with the prospect of China’s GDP surpassing that of the United States in the next 10–20 years, a great debate has started in the West. But it is a wrong debate, for it is not a debate on how the meaning and context of political legitimacy may have to be enriched through renewed cultural interaction, but on the logic of great power rivalries – first promoted by Edward Gibbon, followed by Oswald Spengler and later revived by Arnold Toynbee, Paul Kennedy and, most recently, Graham Allison (the Thucydides Trap). Such discourse on the great power “rise and fall” phenomenon is a typical Western one, as the primary concern is over whether China will integrate into the existing (i.e., West-dominated) world order or seek to destroy it.

As an undemocratic system, China is automatically considered an illegitimate state. The teleological fantasy that all regimes will at some point – no matter how slow they move – become liberal-democracies modeled after the West remains at the core of Western imaginations. In the West, especially in the United States, the ideological context of the Sino-West relations is cast as democracy versus communist despotism. That China is on the wrong side of history is never considered a question. Therefore, a peaceful and prosperous China must be a democratic China. This book raises a challenging question: “*why* China needs democracy?” The answer to this question will have a decisive impact on two practical issues: how would China start reforming its internal system and becoming a responsible member of the international community; and what could be the role of the United States and Europe in this process. As sociologist Amitai Etzioni pointed out, “Two generations ago, it was widely believed that the world progressed from tradition to modernity, this notion is currently viewed by many as naively optimistic.”¹⁷

The methodology of this study is conditioned on the fact that Chinese cultural tradition lacks ontology and teleology, which means that the Chinese language has no abstract nouns commonly used in Europe for metaphysical discourse, but only action-based gerunds. This is why the Chinese philosophers can never ask the typical Cartesian question “*que est-ce que c’est* (what is it)?” not to mention “*cogito ergo sum* (I think, therefore I am)”, but rather “where is the way (Tao 道)?” Life is a constant movement toward an unknown end, so finding a right way at a crossroad is the purpose for all human activities including political acts. Thus, the Chinese have never reached a conceptual position to search for

“legitimacy” in its ontological context. The abstract philosophical language created by European Enlightenment cannot describe China.

This study was originally intended for discussing four Chinese keywords concerning politics in a framework of Ludwig Wittgenstein. Starting with “legitimacy,” I have found out that, after 13 years of intellectual enquiry, these keywords require far more analytical scope than I originally envisioned. I have taken the sound advice from Professor Quentin Skinner to present each concept as a single volume rather than a single volume for all four concepts: these are “legitimacy,” “republicanism,” “economics” and “foreign relations,” and in this way the argument can be more consistent and focused.

My approach differs from prevailing scholarships on Chinese politics in two fundamental ways. I refuse to follow the so-called “Neo-Confucianist” approach, which is popular among China scholars overseas. They try to bring Chinese traditional concepts into modern Western setting, creating ahistorical and syncretic illusion of universal validity of Confucian culture and values.¹⁸ Nor do I rely upon the analytical tools of Western political science or history to offer a grand narrative patterned after the Enlightenment orthodoxy. It is a genuine study of conceptual history, simply following the trajectory of a single concept as a speech-act, rather than abstract intellectual meditation, to describe its original meaning and its modern transformation.

Since I start this book with a major event, a religious controversy in China almost four centuries ago, I also end up with Pope John Paul II who was prescient in stressing the need for reviving the Jesuit *accommodatio* (accommodationist) approach to deal with China. Now the Jesuit Pope Francis seems to have followed his lead. China and the Vatican finally had made a breakthrough in their relations on September 22, 2018.¹⁹ To do this, we have to restart the original debate in the 17th century. The current debate on China is mostly irrelevant precisely because it is largely ahistorical or pseudo-historical, and deeply rooted in a fixed conceptual framework, sustained by a whole set of semi-theological language on democracy. There is little room for serious dialogue anymore between Chinese civilization and that of the West.

Notes

- 1 Many data issued by China’s official sources have proved this point. Just one example, on April 15, 2013, *People’s Forum*, a bulletin board service on the website of *People’s Daily*, the lead party paper, published the results of what it called a “confidence, faith, and trust” survey in the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) ability to bring about political reforms. Of the more than 3,000 people who took the poll, 80% did not agree overall. The poll consisted of four questions; each had four possible answers: “totally agree,” “agree,” “don’t know” and “disagree.” The first question asked, “Do you agree that the CCP has enough courage and wisdom to accelerate reform?” 72.1% said, “disagree.” The second question was, “Do you agree with the statement ‘to uphold and develop socialism with Chinese characteristics is conducive to the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority in China?’” This time 82.1% chose “disagree.” For sources, please see www.chinainperspective.com/ArtShow.aspx?AID=20739.

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- It is true, however, that since Xi's ascendance to power most such polls have been suppressed, but the official claim that majority of Chinese still hold faith with the system is just propaganda, totally unreliable.
- 2 An utterance that performs an act or creates a state of affairs not just describes facts but demonstrates the importance of how language is used to accomplish objectives within specific situations.
 - 3 Wittgenstein Ludwig, *Culture and Value*, translated by Peter Winch, edited by G. H. von Wright. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984.
 - 4 *Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society*, translated and edited by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p. 136–138.
 - 5 Bendix, Reinhard, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. University of California Press, 1977, pp. 99–100.
 - 6 Ashcraft, Richard (ed.), *John Locke: Critical Assessments*. London: Routledge, 1991, p. 524.
 - 7 Sternberger Dolf, "Legitimacy", in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, edited by D.L. Sills, Vol. 9. New York: Macmillan, 1968, p. 244. Sternberger also coined the term "constitutional patriotism." The term refers to a situation whereby an individual or a group feels a political attachment to the norms, values and, indirectly, procedures of a liberal democratic constitution.
 - 8 G. Leibniz, *Discourse on the Natural Theology of the Chinese*. University of Hawaii Press, 1977.
 - 9 By ideology, it means the body of ideas reflecting the social needs and aspirations of an individual, group, class or culture, i.e., a set of doctrines or beliefs that form the basis of a political, economic or other system.
 - 10 John Bowker, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Politics*, edited by Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan. Oxford University Press, 1997.
 - 11 For recent works on "Confucian democracy," see Daniel Bell, and Li Chenyang (eds.), *The East Asian Challenge for Democracy: Political Meritocracy in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press, 2013; Tan Sor-Hoon, *Confucian Democracy: A Deweyan Reconstruction*. Albany: SUNY Press, 2003; Sunmoon Kim, *Confucian Democracy in East Asia, Theory and Practice*. Cambridge University Press, 2014.
 - 12 John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government*, (1689.), Cambridge University Press; Student.
 - 13 Montesquieu's *The Spirit of the Laws* started the tradition of attacking Chinese despotism.
 - 14 Chinese Rites Controversy (1645–1742) is a bitter dispute within the Catholic Church over a fundamental question brought about by the Jesuit missionaries in China: whether Chinese can become Christians and at the same time be allowed to maintain their cultural tradition in daily ceremonies, such as ancestor worship and pray at Confucian temples. The Jesuits believed in the accommodationist approach, but most others disagree. After a century of debate, which was entwined with Church politics, the Vatican decided against the Jesuits in a papal Bull of 1742.
 - 15 The leading Enlightenment scholars, such as Ernst Cassirer and Peter Gay, focused entirely on Europe; no reference was given to Confucius and China at all. This reflects the fact that the essence of Enlightenment was Eurocentric, and *philosophes* scholars never made real efforts to understand China, for they simply used China to support their cultural and political agenda.
 - 16 Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and The Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Peter Baehr and Gordon C. Wells. Penguin Books, 2002.
 - 17 A. Etzioni, *The New Golden Rule, Community and Morality in a Democratic Society*. Basic Books, 1997, p. xvii.
 - 18 See works by Tu Wei-Ming and many others.
 - 19 See my analysis three months before the breakthrough, Lanxin Xiang, "China and the Vatican," *Survival*, vol. 60, no. 3, June 2018, London.

- 1 For a brilliant recent study on how the Chinese being made “yellow” and eventually a “peril”, see Michael Keevak, *Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
- 2 Cries against the Jesuits rose louder and louder until on this day July 21, 1773, Pope Clement XIV dissolved the order completely.
- 3 For a detailed discussion of Jesuit political thought, see Harro Hoepfli, *Jesuit Political Thought*, especially chapters 5 and 6. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- 4 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1959, 1991, paperback, p. 43.
- 5 Q11: add, Chan, Albert (1976), “João Rodrigues”, *Dictionary of Ming Biography*, 1368–1644, Vol. II: M–Z, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 1145–47.
- 6 Luo Wenzao (罗文藻) (1616–1691) became the first Chinese priest in 1656 and the first Chinese Bishop in 1685. He was also known as George Lopez (Spanish: Gregorio Lopez) in the Philippines.
- 7 Claudia von Collani, “A Note on 300 Years Anniversary of the Kangxi Emperor’s Edict of Toleration”, *Sino-Western Relations Journal*, vol. 14, 1992, pp. 62–63.
- 8 Quoted in Alan Charles Kors, *Atheism in France, 1650–1729: The Orthodox Sources of Disbelief*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 171–172.
- 9 Ibid, note 8, Collani.
- 10 Dan. J. Li, trans., *China in Transition, 1517–1911*. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1969, pp. 22–24.
- 11 Forbidden Place Museum ed., *Kangxi and the Correspondences with Papal Envoys from Rome*, in Chinese. Beijing, Forbidden City Museum, 1932, pp. 41–42.
- 2 Quoted in Louis K. Ho, *The Dragon and the Cross: Why European Christianity Failed to Take Roots in China*. www.Xulon.Press, p. 222.
- 13 Forbidden Place Museum ed., *Kangxi and the Correspondences with Papal Envoys from Rome*, in Chinese. Beijing, 1932, p. 13–14.
- 14 Austin, John L., *How to Do Things with Words*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 101.
- 15 Morales, J.B., “Quaesta xvii a Fr. J.B. de Moralez, missionum sinarum procuratore, proposita Romae 1643 S. Congreg. de Prop. Fide” (Rome, 1645).
- 16 The Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples (CEP) was established by Pope Gregory XV with the publication of the Papal Bull *Inscrutabili Divinae Providentiae* (June 22, 1622). Soon after, other foundational papal documents followed: *Romanum decet* (published on the same day), *Cum inter multiplices* (December 14, 1622), *Cum nuper* (June 13, 1623) and *Immortalis Dei* (August 1, 1627). Until 1982, it was known as The Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith or Propaganda Fide.
- 17 S.C. Propaganda Fide, 8 December 1939, AAS 32–24.
- 18 From 1645 to 1704, the Vatican issued various encyclicals and edicts concerning the rites controversy, with rather equivocal results – with their respective contents often depending entirely upon whether they had most recently been petitioned by a Dominican or a Jesuit. In 1704, Clement XI decided against the Jesuit position.
- 19 Jonathan Spence, *Emperor of China a Self-portrait of Kang Hsi*. New York City, Vintage Reissue Edition, 1988, p. 211.
- 20 Father George Minamiki, *The Chinese Rites Controversy from Its Beginning to Modern Times*. Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1985, p. 145.
- 21 Ibid., p. 177.
- 22 Ibid., p. 197.
- 1 John Bowker, *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of World Religions*. Oxford University Press, 1997.
- 2 Gottfried W. Leibniz, *Novissime Sinica*. University Press of Hawaii, p. 47.
- 3 Ibid.
- 4 Confucius, *Analects*, Book 6, chapter 6.
- 5 One of the best studies of Rococo and China is Adolf Reichwein’s *China and Europe: Intellectual and Artistic Contacts in the Eighteenth Century*, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1925.

- 6 Pierre Poivre, *Voyages d'un philosophe ou observations sur les mœurs et les arts des peuples de l'Afrique, de l'Asie et de l'Amérique*, Fortuné-Barthélemy de Félice, 1769, p. 23.
- 7 Adam Smith (Author), Edwin Cannan (Editor), George J. Stigler (Preface), *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, vol. I, chapter 8, p. 24. Paperback, University of Chicago Press, 1977.
- 8 *The Machiavellian Moment* is a work of intellectual history by J. G. A. Pocock, Princeton University Press, 1975. It argues for a connection between republican thought in early 16th-century Florence, English Civil War and American Revolution. A “Machiavellian moment” is a moment when a new republic encounters the problem of stability and of its ideals and institutions. Machiavelli believed in a series of crises facing early 16th-century Florence in which a virtuous state was on the verge of collapse. In response, Machiavelli sought to revive classical republican ideals. *The Machiavellian Moment* inspired the idea that America was born with a fear of corruption and a desire to promote classical virtue.
- 9 Georg W.F. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, translated by Hugh Barr Nisbet. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, p. 54.
- 10 Three sources of the writings of Karl Marx reflect the fact that Marxism was part and parcel of Orientalism: *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, *The British Rule in India* and *The Further Results of British Rule in India*.
- 11 Montesquieu Charles-Louis, *The Spirit of the Laws*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 128.
- 12 Voltaire's *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations* changed the face of Western historiography. His aim is to tell the story of human progress, in particular the progress of human reason.
- 13 Confucius, *Analects*, 3:12, translated by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont. New York, 1998, p. 83.
- 14 Michael Keevak, *Becoming Yellow: A Short History of Racial Thinking*. Princeton University Press, 2011.
- 15 *Ibid.*, pp. 76–78.
- 16 Quoted by Walter Demel, *Als Fremde in China: Das Reich der Mitte im Spiegel frühneuzeitlicher Reiseberichte*. Munich, 1992, p. 652.
- 17 Rolando Minuti, “Gobbon and the Asiatic Barbarians: Notes on the French Sources of the Decline and Fall”, in David Womersley edited, *Edward Gibbon, Bicentenary Essays*, p. 22, Oxford University Press, 1997.
- 18 *logocentrism*, the term used by Jacques Derrida and other exponents of *deconstructionism* to designate the desire for a center or original guarantee of all meanings, which in Derrida's view has characterized Western philosophy since Plato. The Greek word *logos* can just mean “word”, but in philosophy it often denotes an ultimate principle of truth or reason, while in Christian theology it refers to the Word of God as the origin and foundation of all things. Derrida's critique of logocentric thinking shows how it attempts to repress difference in favor of identity and presence: the philosophical “metaphysics of presence” craves a “transcendental signified” or ultimately self-sufficient meaning (e.g. God, Man, Truth).
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 132.
- 20 For detailed discussion of the Jesuit view on tyrannicide, see Harro Hoepfl, *Jesuit Political Thought*, chapter 13, *Tyrannicide and Allegiance*. Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 314–338. See also, *An English Translation of Book I of Juan de Mariana's De Rege Et Regis Institutione*, translated by George Albert Moore. Georgetown University Press, 1947.
- 21 Represented by John Kong Fairbank, the late Harvard guru of modern China studies, see Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China—Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. Columbia University Press, 2010.
- 22 See Paul A. Cohen, *Discovering History in China: American Historical Writing on the Recent Chinese Past*. Columbia University Press, 1984.
- 23 For a controversial book on the Popper-Wittgenstein controversy, see David Edmonds and John Eidinow, *Wittgenstein's Poker*. HarperCollins, 2001. There remain some disagreements on the details, of course.

- 24 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. London, 1946.
- 25 Quentin Skinner, "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", in *History and Theory*, vol. 8, 1969, p. 125.
- 26 Kenneth Minogue, *A Very Short History of Politics*. Oxford, 2000, p. 1.
- 27 For a fascinating book on the comparison between ancient Greece and China, see Geoffrey Lloyd, *Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections—Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture*. Oxford, 2004, especially chapter 12, "A critique of Democracy".
- 28 One recent example, the *Cambridge History of Ancient China* criticizes the classic Chinese political writing this way, "This concern never leads toward any resemblance of democracy: it is always taken for granted that the only way to be effective is to gain the ear and the confidence of a lord." See Cambridge History, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 748–749.
- 29 David Hawkes, *Ideology*, 2nd Edition. London: Routledge, p. 28.
- 30 Confucius, *Analects* 12:12, "Zheng zhe zheng ye (governing effectively is doing what is proper, if you lead by doing what is proper, who would dare do otherwise?)"
- 31 Confucius, *Analects*, translated by Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont Jr. New York: Ballantine Book, 1998. Throughout this study I use their translation which I considered best and most accurate.
- 32 Lao Zi, *Tao Te Jing*, chapter 60.
- 33 As late as in the early 20th century, during a debate about whether "politics" should be translated in the Japanese way, i.e., zheng zhi, the founding father of the Chinese republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, argued forcefully it should. See selected works of Sun Yat-sen (in Chinese), vll. II, p. 661, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1981.
- 34 A most influential modern writer, Lu Xun, called the Chinese tradition a "man-eating" culture. See his famous short story published in 1918, "Madman's Diary", *Lu Xun Collective Works*, vol. 1. Shanghai, 1984.
- 35 Koselleck, Reinhart, *Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese, Freiburg/Munchen*. 1959, chapter 1, Munchen: Surkamp Verlag, 1973 edition.
- 36 Natural law is a system of law that is determined by nature, and so is universal. Classically, natural law refers to the use of reason to analyze human nature – both social and personal – and deduce binding rules of moral behavior from it.
- 37 Sir Geoffrey Lloyd of Cambridge University pointed this out brilliantly to me in his response to my draft speech at the Library of Congress on July 7, 2004. Strauss distinguished "scholars" from "great thinkers", identifying himself as a scholar. He wrote that most self-described philosophers are in actuality scholars, cautious and methodical. Great thinkers, in contrast, boldly and creatively address big problems. Scholars deal with these problems only indirectly by reasoning about the great thinkers' differences. See Leo Strauss, "An Introduction to Heideggerian Existentialism", in *The Rebirth of Classical Political Rationalism*, edited by Thomas L. Pangle. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989, pp. 29–30.
- 39 Quentin Skinner, *The Foundation of Modern Political Thought*, Vol. 1, The Renaissance. Cambridge, 1976, p. xiii.
- 1 See *An Etymological Glossary of Selected Modern Chinese Words*, Chinese Language Society of Hong Kong, Shanghai, 2001.
- 2 Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave*. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, p. 307.
- 3 "Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time or war where every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to the time wherein men live without other security than what their own strength and their own invention shall furnish them withal. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, chapter XIII: Of the Natural Condition of Mankind as Concerning Their Felicity and Misery, p. 89, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, edited by Richard Tuck. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

- 4 For this famous Vico quote, see Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/vico/>.
- 5 Robin George Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, 1946 edition. London: Martino Fine Books, 2014.
- Collingwood thought that history cannot be studied in the same way as natural science because the internal thought processes of historical persons cannot be perceived with the physical senses, and past historical events cannot be directly observed. He suggested that a historian must “reconstruct” history by using “historical imagination” to “reenact” the thought processes of historical persons based on information and evidence from historical sources.
- 6 Unilineal evolution (also referred to as classical social evolution) is a 19th-century social theory about the evolution of societies and cultures. It was composed of many competing theories by those who believed that Western culture is the contemporary pinnacle of social evolution. Different social status is aligned in a single line that moves from most primitive to most civilized. This theory is now generally considered obsolete in academic circles.
- 7 See Oswyn Murray, *Early Greece*. Sussex, 1980, Moses Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History*. London, 1980; *Ancient History: Evidence and Models*. London, 1986 and Phyllis Culham and Lowell Edmonds (eds.), *Classics: A Discipline and Profession in Crisis*. New York and London, 1989. See also Charles Freeman’s brilliant summary of the recent scholarship on this issue in *Egypt, Greece and Rome*, chapter 1. Oxford, 1996.
- 8 Georg W.F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, translated by John Sibree. New York: Dover, 1956, Part I, The Oriental World, pp. 17–18.
- 9 For an earlier expose on this point, see Xiang Lanxin, *Tradition and Foreign Relations* (传统与对外关系). Beijing: Sanlian Press, 2008.
- 10 Maddison Angus, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 960–2030 AD*. OECD, 2007, p. 44.
- 11 For politics and foreign relations of China, see Lanxin Xiang, *The Origins of the Boxer War, a Multinational Study*. London: Taylor Francis, 2003, especially chapters 1–4.
- 12 Huxley Thomas, 1900, vol. 2, p. 285.
- 13 Complete Works of Lu Xun, *People’s Press for Literature*, vol. 2. Beijing, 1981, p. 296.
- 14 The May Fourth Movement is the most important anti-tradition intellectual movement in China’s modern history. See Chow Tse-tsung, *The May Fourth Movement*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960.
- 15 From today’s point of view, the revolutionary leader Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s famous slogan, “Driving out the slavery Tartars and restoring China,” is a racist argument.
- 16 Gilbert K. Chesterton, “The Blunders of Our Parties”, *Illustrated London News*, 1924.
- 17 Gilbert K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*, chapter 4, The Ethics of Elfland.
- 18 This author has made a contribution to this effort; see Xiang, Lanxin, *Chuantong yu Duiwai Guanxi* (Tradition and External Relations of China). Beijing: Sanlian Press, 2007.
- 19 Xi Jinping, speech made when visiting the exhibition, “The Road to Rejuvenation” on November 29, 2012 in Beijing History Museum. See, Xi Jinping, *The Governance of China*. Beijing, China: Foreign Languages Press Co., Ltd, 2014, pp. 37, 39.
- 20 Hegel, *The Philosophy of History*, Part I. The Oriental World, 1956, p. 22.
- 21 See Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. Penguin, 2003 and *Sociology of Religion*, Beacon Press, 1993; and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981. More discussion on legitimacy and economic development, see Chapter 5.
- 22 Du Halde, *Description géographique*, vol. 1, pp. 120–122, 4 volumes, 1735, Paris.
- 23 The metaphor developed in Renaissance times, as the medical knowledge of human body based upon the classical work of Galen was being challenged by new thinkers such as William Harvey.

- 24 According to Plato, the principles of Athenian democracy (as it existed in his day) must be rejected as only a few are fit to rule. "I suspect, for the human race, either philosophers become kings in our cities, or the people who are now called kings and rulers become... philosophers." Plato, *The Republic*, 473c–d, p. 175, *Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought*, edited by Giovanni R.F. Ferrari. Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- 25 Henry Kissinger, *On China*. London and New York: Allen Lane, 2011, p. 31.
- 26 Skinner, Quentin, "The Danger that the Historian May Conceptualize an Argument in Such a Way That Its Alien Elements Dissolve into a Misleading Familiarity", *Visions of Politics*, vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 76.
- 27 L. Susan Brown. *The Politics of Individualism: Liberalism, Liberal Feminism, and Anarchism*. Black Rose Book, Ltd., 1993, p. 2.
- 28 Ellen Meiksins Wood, *Mind and Politics: An Approach to the Meaning of Liberal and Socialist Individualism*. University of California Press, 1972, pp. 6–7.
- 29 Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius, A Philosophical Translation*. New York: The Ballantine Books, 1998, p. 56.
- 30 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, edited by Walter Kaufmann, vol. 9. New York: Vintage, 1966, p. 267.
- 31 In the tradition of semiotics developed by Ferdinand de Saussure the sign relation is dyadic, consisting only of a form of the sign (the signifier) and its meaning (the signified). Saussure saw this relation as being essentially arbitrary motivated only by social convention. Saussure's theory has been particularly influential in the study of linguistic signs.
- 32 The origin of this term comes from the Sanskrit term Loka Dhatu (cosmos), which Chinese Buddhist monks translated into *Shijie* (generational boundaries).
- 33 In a private conversation with Henry Kissinger in 2004, I explained this Chinese conception of individual and the difficulty for democracy to function well there; Kissinger agreed, "You have too many individuals!"
- 34 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, p. 34.
- 35 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 2nd edition, translated by Joe Sachs. Green Lion Press, 2002, p. 1075a.
- 36 Ronald Dworkin, *Taking Rights Seriously*. London: Duckworth, 1977, p. 152.
- 37 Usually refers to the right of people to do or say things that are not illegal without being stopped or interrupted by the government.
- 38 Isaiah Berlin made this point brilliantly, but his "positive liberty" of self-realization is based on a misunderstanding of the classic liberal theory.
- 39 The best work on various meanings of liberty and its relations to liberalism is Quentin Skinner's *Liberty before Liberalism*. Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- 40 One may argue that in the internet age, the rapid information and knowledge dissemination could also pose ever deadlier threat to the Chinese state if it misbehaves morally.
- 41 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge: Harvard, 1973.
- 42 Julia Ching, "Human Rights: A Valid Chinese Concept", in *Confucianism and Human Rights*, edited by Wm. Theodore de Bary and Tu Wei-ming. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 277.
- 43 Confucius, *Analects*, 2.3, Ames and Rosemont trans., p. 76.
- 44 *Ibid.*, 12.13, p. 157.
- 45 For this discussion, I learnt a lot from David Hall and Roger Ames, in their book *Democracy of the Dead: Dewey, Confucius and Hope for Democracy in China*. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.
- 1 Bendix Reinhard, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. University of California Press, 1977, p. 103.
- 2 Sun Yat-sen, *Collected Works of Sun Yat-sen (国父全集)*, vol. 1, ebook collection, Taiwan: Sun Yat-sen Studies Database, p. 233, <http://sunology.culture.tw/cgi-bin/gs32/s1gswb.cgi?o=dcorpus&s=id=%22ES000000001%22.&searchmode=basic>.
- 3 See Jin Guantao, and Liu Qingfeng, "From 'Republicanism' to 'Democracy': China's Selective Absorption and Reconstruction of Modern Western Political Concepts

- 4 Hironaka Ann, *Neverending Wars: The International Community, Weak States, and the Perpetuation of Civil War*. Harvard University Press, 2005.
- 5 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- 6 Quentin Skinner, *Liberty before Liberalism*. Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- 7 Tang, Xiaobing, *Global Space and the Nationalist Discourse of Modernity: The Historical Thinking of Liang Qichao*. Stanford University Press, 1996, p. 185.
- 8 See Confucian classic, *Book of Rites* 禮記•曲禮上》:“夫禮者，所以定親疏，決嫌疑，別同異，明是非也。” *Book of Rites* (礼记), *Thirteen Classics* (十三经注疏), vol. I. Hangzhou. China: Zhejiang Publishing House for Classics, 1997, p. 1231.
- 9 The *Book of Rites* or *Liji* is a collection of texts describing the social forms, administration and ceremonial rites of the Zhou dynasty as they were understood in the Warring States and the early Han periods. The *Book of Rites*, along with the *Rites of Zhou* (Zhouli) and the *Book of Etiquette and Rites* (Yili), which are together known as the “Three Li (San li),” constitute the ritual (li) section of the Five Classics which lay at the core of the traditional Confucian canon (each of the “five” classics is a group of works rather than a single text.) as a core text of the Confucian canon.
- 10 See Guo Yu, *Zhou Dynasty* (国语.周语). Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1984, p. 35. Translation by the author.
- 11 Frank Ankersmit, *Political Representation*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002, p. 43.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 55.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 64.
- 14 See *People’s Daily* website, “the Origins and the Power of the CCP Secretariat” <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/68742/69118/69658/4835911.html>.
- 15 On April 30, 2019, Xi made a public speech to celebrate the 100th-year anniversary of the May Fourth Movement. While this long speech is completely void of substance, it focuses only on communist utopia and patriotism. For the whole text, see, www.xinhuanet.com/politics/leaders/2019-04/30/c_1124440193.htm.
- 16 The Great Unity (Chinese: 大同, datong) is a Chinese concept referring to a utopian vision of the world in which everyone and everything is at peace. It is found in classical Chinese philosophy which has been invoked many times in modern Chinese history. The concept was used by Kang Youwei in his visionary utopian treatise, *The Book of Great Unity* (大同书).
- 17 The clear examples are the humiliating defeats of every dynastic restoration attempt in early republican period, especially those by Generals Yuan Shikai and Zhang Xun in 1915 and 1917. The former lasted over 100 days, and the latter only 12.
- 18 For early analysis on Wang’s reading or misreading of de Tocqueville, see Lanxin Xiang (相蓝欣), “Anticorruption Campaign Must Be a Forward-Looking Rather Than Backward-Looking”(反腐应向前看而非向后看), *Global Times* (环球时报), December 14, 2012, p. 7.
- 1 John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, 4th Edition. Harvard University Press, 1983.
- 2 David S. Landes, “Why Europe and the West, Why Not China?”, *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 20, No. 2, 2006, pp. 3–22; for his earlier work, see *The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor*. W. W. Norton & Company, New York 1998.
- 3 Angus Maddison, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run. 960–2030 AD*. Center for Development Studies, OECD, 2007.
- 4 Weber argued that while several factors were good for the development of a capitalist economy (long periods of peace, improved control of rivers, population growth, freedom to acquire land and move outside of native community, freedom of choosing the occupation), they were outweighed by others (mostly stemming from religion) in China. See Reinhard Bendix, *Max Weber: An Intellectual Portrait*. University of California Press, 1977, p. 116.
- 5 Joseph Needham, *The Grand Tradition: Science and Society in East and West*, Routledge, [1969] 2013.

- 6 Mark Elvin, "The High-Level Equilibrium Trap: The Causes of the Decline of Invention in the Traditional Chinese Textile Industries", in *Economic Organization in Chinese Society*, edited by W. E. Willmott. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972, pp. 137–140.
- 7 John Maynard Keynes, book review of *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*, by Chen Huan-chang. Columbia University Studies, New York: Longmans, 1911. *The Economic Journal*, Vol. 22, No. 88, Dec. 1912, p. 584. The quote of Confucius comment is from *Analects*:13.9.
- 8 David Landes, *The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present*, 2nd edition. Cambridge University Press, July 14, 2003.
- 9 Max Weber, *The Religion of China*, translated by Hans H. Gerth. New York: Free Press; Collier-Macmillan, 1951, pp. 149–150.
- 10 See, for example, Thorstein Veblen, *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*. New York: MacMillan, 1915, and Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, a Book of Essays*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1962.
- 11 See Angus Maddison, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 960–2030 AD*. OECD, 2007, p. 44.
- 12 Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man, the Social Basis of Politics*, 4th printing. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 28.
- 13 Murray Newton Rothbard, *Economic Thought before Adam Smith*. Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1995, p. 386.
- 14 John James Clarke, *Oriental Enlightenment: The Encounter between Asian and Western Thought*. Routledge, 1997, p. 50, and Baghdiantz McCabe, *Orientalism in Early Modern France: Eurasian Trade Exoticism and the Ancien Regime*. London: Berg Publishers, 2008, pp. 271–272.
- 15 See John S. Mill, *On Liberty*, especially chapter 2 and Georg F. Hegel, *Philosophy of History*.
- 16 Tzu Lao, *Tao Te Ching*, chapter 56, translated by Victor H. Mair, Bantam, 1990.
- 17 See James Miller, "English Romanticism and Chinese Nature Poetry", *Comparative Literature*, Vol. 24, No. 3, Summer 1972, pp. 223–224.
- 18 David Calleo, and Benjamin Rowland, *America and World Political Economy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, p. 254.
- 19 Bronk, Richard, *The Romantic Economist: Imagination in Economics*. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- 20 Kathrine Gallagher, *The Body Economic: Life, Death, and Sensation in Political Economy and the Victorian Novel*, especially chapter 1, *Romantics and the Political Economists*, Princeton University Press, 2009.
- 21 *Ibid.*, p. 21.
- 22 Confucius, *Analects*, 16.1.
- 23 *China's Family Income Gini Index Reaches 0.61*, see official report at *Global Times*, December 10, 2012. <http://finance.huanqiu.com/china/2012-12/3361155.html>.
- 24 February 1, 2001, *The People's Daily*, Beijing.
- 25 Deng Xiaoping, *Selected Work of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平文选)*, Vol. 3. Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1993, p. 139.
- 26 Reeve, *Aristotle: Politics*, op. cit., p. IV.7.
- 27 China's Wealthiest Discreetly Stay Away at Party Congress, *Bloomberg News*, October 1, 2012, www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-30/absent-china-billionaires-show-wealth-limited-at-party-congress.html.
- 28 John M. Hobson, *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation*. Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- 29 Huan-Chang Chen, *The Economic Principles of Confucius and His School*. New York: Longmans, 1911, p. 444.
- 30 *Ibid.*, p. 445.
- 31 Calleo and Rowland, *America and World Political Economy*, 1973, p. 254.

- 32 F.A. Hayek, *Monetary Nationalism and International Stability*. London: Longmans, Green-Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Publication Number 18, 1937. Hayek defines monetary nationalism thus,

By Monetary Nationalism I mean the doctrine that a country's share in the world's supply of money should not be left to be determined by the same principles and the same mechanism as those which determine the relative amounts of money in its different regions or localities.

p. 3

- 33 See Angus Maddison, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run, 960–2030 AD*, OECD, Table 2.2a: Shares of World GDP, 1700–2030 AD, 2007, p. 44.
- 34 A typical comment was offered by The Economist on January 22, 2009, “Global Economic Imbalance.”
- 35 Samuel Taylor Coleridge, *Statesman's Manual*, 1816, in Lay Sermons, edited by R.J. White, London and Princeton, 1972, p. 76.
- 36 Anthony D. Smith, *Theories of Nationalism*. New York, 2005, p. 28.
- 37 See Lanxin Xiang, *Tradition and Foreign Relations* (传统与对外关系), Beijing: Sanlian Press, Chapter 8: *The Ideological Context of International Economy*, 2007.
- 1 For the details of China's first foreign office, see Banno Masataka, *China and the West 1858–1861: The Origins of the Tsungli Yamen*. Harvard University Press, 1973.
- 2 The most well-known triumphant theorist is Francis Fukuyama.
- 3 *Ibid.*, p. 2.
- 4 Amitav Acharya, and Barry Buzan (eds.), *Non-Western International Relations Theory: Perspectives On and Beyond Asia*. London: Routledge, 2010.
- 5 *Ibid.*, pp. 45–46.
- 6 *Ibid.*, p. 61.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 69.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- 9 *Ibid.*, p. 85.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 87.
- 11 Henry Kissinger, *On China*, Allen Lane, 2011, p. 490.
- 12 Emillian Kavalski (ed.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Chinese Foreign Policy*. Ashgate: Surrey and Vermont, 2012, p. 3.
- 13 Dale Grandall-Bear (ed.), *Exploring the Global Past: Original Sources in World History*, Vol. 2, Matteo Ricci Diaries excerpts. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall Hunt, 2001, p. 2.
- 14 Confucius, *Analects*, 12:7.
- 15 *Ibid.*, 15:24.
- 16 Geoffrey Lloyd, *Ancient Worlds, Modern Reflections: Philosophical Perspectives on Greek and Chinese Science and Culture*. Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 177.
- 17 For Foucault's thinking about international politics, see Michel Foucault, *Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–1978*. Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- 18 OECD's most recent study suggests that this could come as early as in 2016, March 22, 2013, see www.oecd.org/economy/china-2013.htm.
- 19 Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers*. New York: Random House, 1987, p. 447.
- 20 J.M. Keynes, *A Tract on Monetary Reform*, 1923, Ch. 3, p. 80.
- 21 See, for example, Gordon Chang, *The Coming Collapse of China*. Random House, 2001.
- 22 Will Hutton, *The Writing on the Wall: China and the West in the 21st Century*. Little Brown, 2007, p. xi.
- 23 Kissinger, *On China*, p. 112.
- 24 *Ibid.*, p. 31.

- 25 Ibid., pp. 526–530.
- 26 Kissinger, *A World Restored*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957, p. 193.
- 27 Kissinger, *On China*, p. 199.
- 28 For declassified US government transcript of Mao-Nixon conversation on February 21, 1972, see <http://china.usc.edu/mao-zedong-meets-richard-nixon-february-21-1972>.
- 29 Ibid., p. 526.
- 30 A typical work is by Aaron Friedberg, *A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia*. W.W. Norton, 2011.
- 31 Kissinger, *The World Restored*, *ibid.*, p. 206.
- 32 Ibid., p. 328.
- 33 Part of the argument first appeared in “Why Washington Does Not Speak Chinese?”, by Lanxin Xiang, Outlook Section, *The Washington Post*, May 25, 2005.
- 34 George Gale, Leibnitz, Peter the Great and the modernization of Russia. Or adventures of a philosopher-king in the East, Maison des Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société (Sofia), 2005.
- 1 For the text of Pope John Paul II’s speech, see http://w2.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/2001/october/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_20011024_matteoricci.html.
- 2 For a detailed study, see Lanxin Xiang, *The Origins of the Boxer War, a Multinational Study*. London: Routledge-Curzon, 2003.

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- , *Anticipating China: Thinking Through the Narratives of Chinese and Western Culture*, David Hall and Roger Ames. New York: SUNY Press, 1995.
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